The Ironclad Neutrality

A Review of Robert A. Divine’s Illusion of Neutrality

Robert A. Divine is the George W. Littlefield Professor Emeritus in American History at the University of Texas at Austin. He graduated with a Ph.D. from Yale University in 1954. His research interests are in 20th century American foreign policy and the history of the American presidency.

BY LOGAN MA

The 1930s was the decade of the Depression, a time of economic turmoil and social insecurity for millions of Americans. When most look back to this turbulent period, they recall the economic crisis and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s tenacious efforts to tackle it in the form of his New Deal. However, amidst this backdrop of domestic policies, another issue gradually took importance – the issue of America’s role on the global stage. For the majority of its first century of its existence, the young American nation closely adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, pursuing an isolationist foreign policy aloof from the affairs of nations outside the Americas. That all changed with the outbreak of the First World War. America ultimately became involved in the war and, for the first time, took an active role in global affairs. However, the terrible costs of the war saw a rapid retreat in American foreign policy. The idealistic notion that America should play an active in global affairs, so fiercely advocated by the Wilson administration in its Fourteen Points, gave way to an isolationist urge to “prevent American involvement in future foreign wars.”1 The efforts of the isolationist movement culminated in the passage of the Neutrality Acts of ’35, ’37, and ’39, which were attempts to prevent American involvement in foreign wars amidst boiling tensions in Europe and Asia. Robert A. Divine’s The Illusion of Neutrality traces the history of neutrality legislation, from their origins in the late 1920s to the passage of the final Neutrality Act in 1939. In his book, Divine utilizes a variety of sources that include government files, newspaper periodicals, and private correspondences to present an excellent study of one of the lesser known sections of American history.

The first chapter of Divine’s book traces the beginnings of neutrality legislation in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Supporters of the internationalist movement saw the ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a constructive step that opened up the possibility reforming American foreign policy from the isolationist policies of the 1920s to a policy that would involve American cooperation for collective security. Their efforts in the wake of the pact’s ratification led to the introduction of a House resolution by Representative Theodore E. Burton in 1927. The Burton Resolution, as it is now known, proposed to “embargo the export of arms to aggressor nations.”2 It marked a departure from the traditional American practice of impartiality, which involved the non-discriminatory treatment of all belligerents. However, in the wake of doubts from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Coolidge administration over difficulties in deeming aggressor states and opposition from lobbyists in the arms industries, the resolution was never brought up for passage. In 1929, another effort was made to open up debate over neutrality by Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas. The Capper resolution intended to give the president power to determine if a nation violated the Kellog-Briand Pact and to authorize the “embargo of exports of arms munitions, implements of war, or other articles for use in war” against the aggressor nation.3 It too failed after opponents of the resolution, advocating a non-discriminatory embargo, argued that implementing an embargo upon a single nation would elicit the possibility of drawing America into a war. Although the Burton and Capper resolutions failed to achieve any results, they did provoke discussions over the question of neutrality. From the ashes of the resolutions spawned the notion of new neutrality, which, according to Capper, asserted that the Kellog-Briand Pact had created a diplomatic environment in which “no nation…could remain indifferent when violations occurred.”4 In other words, the antiwar treaty obligated the United States to join the international community in opposing violators of the treaty. On the other hand, traditional neutralists advocated impartiality, which they saw as the only means of preventing American entry into foreign wars.

With the inauguration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a new stage America foreign policy emerged. Roosevelt was widely seen as an advocate of collective security, and within his first few days in office, the administration unveiled a policy that was more supportive of collective security than the policies of Roosevelt’s predecessors. However, efforts to put that policy into practice were hampered by the administration’s preoccupation with domestic issues. The actions of the Nye Committee and the popularization of the Charles Warren’s insulation thesis eventually snuffed out the possibilities of collective security. In 1934, Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota proposed a resolution that called for the investigation of the munitions industry. Riding on a wave of public outcry over accusations that the arms industries “fomented war” for profit, the Nye Committee was established.5 The findings of the Nye committee revealed that the munitions industry’s profits soared exponentially during the First World War, solidifying the belief that America’s entry into the war was the work of munitions makers hungry for profit. The revelations solidified the isolationist cause by further turning the public away from war. At the same time the Nye Committee was conducting its exposés, former assistant attorney general Charles Warren advocated a new interpretation of neutrality that called for the insulation of America from “commercial and financial contact with foreign wars” through the implementation of an “impartial arms embargo on all belligerents, a ban on loans to warring governments, and a declaration by the United States warning all citizens that they traded with belligerents at their own risk.”6 His interpretation stemmed from his belief that “war is inevitable” and that the only safe policy was to “curb American contact with belligerents.”7 Warren further developed his idea by recommending that the government ban entry of belligerent ships and aircraft in American ports and airfields and empower the president with the right to ban Americans from traveling on belligerent ships. His recommendations were well received by the public and the State Department, which promptly began drawing plans for tentative neutrality legislation. The Roosevelt administration’s weak foreign policy stance, the revelations of the Nye Committee, and Charles Warren’s influential interpretation of neutrality led to widening support for isolationist policies, dooming the cause of collective security.

The middle portion of Divine’s book deals with the triumph of isolationism, which was in part sped up by domestic fears that German rearmament and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia might erupt into a global war that would threaten to involve America. As a result of these fears, the debate over neutrality became an important issue for the public for the first time. The Neutrality Act of 1935, enacted in response to Italy’s increasingly aggressive movements against Ethiopia, was a result of several compromises between the isolationist-leaning Nye Committee, now a powerful proponent of isolationism in the Senate, and the State Department. The Act gave the president discretionary power in defining arms, ammunition, and the implements of war for embargoes, while implementing some of the other recommendations of Charles Warren. The growing tensions between Italy and Ethiopia eventually led to open war in October. The Roosevelt administration quickly moved to invoke the provisions of the Neutrality Act by implementing an impartial arms embargo and other measures upon both nations. However, because Ethiopia possessed neither ships nor ocean sports, the weight of the neutrality measures fell upon the Italian economy. Technically, the Roosevelt administration abided by the limitations of the Neutrality Act as it “passively supported measures of collective security against Italy.”8 Weaknesses of the 1935 act became evident when American ships continued trading strategic raw materials with Italy. The Roosevelt administration attempted to cover trade not covered in the Neutrality act by enacting a moral embargo, but that action failed. The Neutrality Act of 1935 was intended to prevent contact with belligerents, but that ban only applied to arms and munitions. Thus, politicians realized the need for broader legislation that would control all categories of exports. The Neutrality Act of 1936 kept the embargo and travel restrictions of the 1935 act, and added a prohibition on loans to belligerent nations. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia raised a dilemma for Americans. The embargoes, although enacted to prevent war, also had a negative impact on the American economy. A solution to this problem came in the form of Bernard Baruch’s cash-and-carry compromise. Problems with the Neutrality Act further emerged upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. In response to those problems, Congress passed a revised neutrality act. The Neutrality Act of 1937 was extended to include civil wars. It included provisions of the previous act, and the addition of a cash-and-carry plan which allowed the president to “require American citizens to transfer title on all exports to belligerents before the goods left the United States.”9 The combination of the mandatory restrictions advocated by the Nye Committee and the cash-and-carry plan revealed the dilemma in Congress in choosing between economic prosperity and peace.

The last section of Divine’s book is somewhat shorter in comparison to the others, as it deals with the collapse of the neutrality acts. In July 1937, sporadic fighting broke out between Japanese and Chinese troops in Northeastern China. Under the Neutrality Act, the president was to invoke the provisions of the act “when he found a state of war to exist.”10 However, since the two nations were not officially at war, Roosevelt decided not to invoke the Neutrality Act. This decision was partially due to sympathy for the Chinese. Had Roosevelt enacted the Neutrality Act, China would have lost all access to arms imports, with Japan being the sole beneficiary of the cash-and-carry plan. In the midst of the conflict, Roosevelt delivered his famous Quarantine Speech, in which he called for “a concerted effort” to restrain those “creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.”11 The Quarantine Speech marked a change in American foreign policy. In its aftermath, America gradually took a more active role in global affairs and repealed the Neutrality Acts.

Divine’s thesis is that the American people, “frightened by the complex forces of threatening the peace of the world, sought to escape them by taking refuge in ironclad neutrality.”12 Americans experienced tremendous losses during the First World War. As a result, the war’s aftermath saw a decline in American involvement on the global stage. That decline was further hastened by the tensions around the world, such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the rise of Nazi Germany. Many Americans believed that these events would precipitate a world war. Divine implies that the American people, having gone through the terrible costs of the First World War, did not wish to be involved in the wars with foreigners. Thus, in an attempt to prevent them from being drawn into another war, they enacted the Neutrality Acts, which were largely based on the recommendations made by Charles Warren. Warren asserted that war was inevitable, and that the best means of avoiding entanglement was to isolate the nation completely from the belligerents by enacting measures such as impartial arms embargoes and travel bans. The author’s points of views and assumptions reflect an accurate understanding of the subject matter. He covers the entire scope of the neutrality bills, and brings into emphasis the legislative proceedings behind the bills. Moreover, he provides information on public opinion of the bills from various sectors of society. Divine’s findings are based on meticulous research and interpretation of numerous primary documents, including government documents and periodicals of the time. He wrote during the ‘60s when the New Left school of American history was just beginning to emerge. Divine’s work reflects many New Left characteristics. Throughout his whole book, he discusses the government’s polarization over American foreign policy, a shark contrast from the consensus school that preceded the New Left. Whereas historians from other eras tend to portray American foreign policy as uniformly isolationist, they failed to identify the internationalist movement and to acknowledge the Roosevelt administration’s internationalist leanings.

In a review of Divine’s book, Frank L. Klingberg praises The Illusion of Neutrality as a notable contribution towards understanding the complexities of American foreign policy during the New Deal. He applauds Divine for writing a “definite and well-balanced study, using the best available documents.”13 He also praises Divine for “fully [describing] the pressures which resulted in the neutrality legislation” with “clarity, completeness, and conciseness.”14 Klingberg identifies a split between three major policies: collective security, the traditional international law of neutrality, and insulation. He focuses especially on Divine’s treatment of Roosevelt, agreeing with Divine’s hypothesis that Roosevelt “built a policy which would enable him to prevent the United States from drifting into war, while retaining freedom to act on the basis of true national interest.”15 Another reviewer, Alexander DeConde, lauds the book as “the most thorough and scholarly history of the neutrality legislation in print” despite “seldom going beyond what his evidence will reasonably support.”16

As both Klingberg and DeConde agree that Divine’s book is one of the most adequate studies of American foreign policy prior to the Second World War. The author utilizes a variety of primary sources, and is “particularly strong in summarizing congressional debates and in analyzing public opinion.”17 However, for a book that emphasizes America’s foreign policy, relatively few passages are devoted to events in the outside world. True, the debates portrayed by Divine were in response to international events. But there is a noticeable absence in perspectives from foreigners. Had Divine included foreigner’s perspectives of the American foreign policy reforms, his book would have had more depth. The effect of the Great Depression on American foreign policy is also vaguely alluded to.

According to the author, America in the 1930s was dominated by the “tragedy and suffering of the depression.”18 However, he also points out that vital developments were taking place in American foreign policy that were often overshadowed by histories of the Great Depression. Diplomatically, the American nation, marred by the effects of the Great Depression, placed more importance in domestic rather than foreign affairs. It was not until the Italian invasion of Ethiopia that foreign policy took importance. With the advent of this crisis, American foreign policy fully embraced isolationism under the Neutrality Act.

Divine mentions that the Americans “attempted to escape from the reality of the world scene.”19 That notion applies solely to the years before the Second World War. Today, the notion that an economic powerhouse like the United States could become isolationist is impossible. We live in a society where global interactions are imperative for the survival of the human race. The planet has experienced so much globalization that the fates of some countries are directly linked to those of others, as shown by the events of the 2008 recession.

In writing The Illusion of Neutrality, Divine presents a comprehensive history of one of the most unknown chapters of American history. Overshadowed by the trauma of the Great Depression, American foreign policy at this time embraced neutrality, believing that it would somehow keep them out of future wars. It ultimately failed.

Endnotes

Student Bio

Logan Ma is a junior at Irvine High School. He was born on July 23, 1993 in Logan, Utah. In the future, he hopes to attend the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and graduate with a degree in international relations with an emphasis on Chinese affairs.